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McNamara: Sexual Misconduct

SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT: APPLYING NEW YORK'S
GENDER-SPECIFIC SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
LAW TO CONSENTING MINORS.
Douglas McNamara'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, I met two 16 year-old Brooklyn teenagers, Nelson V.
and Joe M. Both attended high school, came from two-parent
homes, and had no prior arrests. Both had sexual encounters
with two different 14 year-old girls. Both found themselves
arrested, fingerprinted, and repeat visitors at the Central Criminal
Court building in Brooklyn. Both prosecutions proceeded under
§ 130.20(1) (Sexual Misconduct); a gender-specific law
repeatedly ruled unconstitutional, but then revised by courts to
make it gender-neutral. The result is a law unwanted by the
Legislature, and silent as to who should be charged when minors
engage in sex. The Legislature must devise a distinct statutory
rape law that contemplates - and perhaps even restricts -

prosecutions in consensual minor sexual encounters.
H. THE SEXUAL MISCONDUCT STATUTE
A. The Unexplained Unequal Treatment of Minors
Nearly unique among New York Penal Laws, § 130.20(1)'
applies only to males. Cross-referenced to § 130.05, which
' B.A., State University of New York at Albany, 1988; J.D., New York
University School of Law, 1995. Douglas McNamara currently works as a
staff attorney at the Legal Aid Society's Criminal Defense Division in
Brooklyn, New York.
1 N.Y. Penal Law § 130.20 (McKinney 1998). This section provides in
pertinent part: "A person is guilty of sexual misconduct when ... [b]eing a
male, he engages in sexual intercourse with a female without her consent ....
Id.
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defines consent, § 130.20(1) forbids forcible rape, and sex with
anyone who cannot give consent because she is physically or
mentally incapacitated, or under the age of seventeen 2 . Statutes
that treat males and females differently violate constitutional
guarantees to equal protection unless the government
to the
demonstrates the gender distinction is "substantially related
3
achievement of an important governmental objective."
While the first subdivision of the Sexual Misconduct law

pertains only to males, nothing in the statute's legislative history
explains why.4 In 1984, all of New York's rape laws applied
only to males. Then came the landmark decisions in People v.
Liberta.5 Convicted of raping and sodomizing his estranged wife
in front of their child, Mr. Liberta argued that male-only rape
Under
laws denied him equal protection under the law. 6
"intermediate level scrutiny," the Court of Appeals found the
rape law did violate the Equal Protection Clause. The court
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.05 (McKinney 1998). This section provides in
pertinent part:
1. Whether or not specifically stated, it is an element of
every offense ...
that the sexual act was committed without
consent of victim.
2. Lack of consent results from (a) forcible compulsion; or
(b) incapacity to consent...
3. A person is deemed incapable of consent when he is: less
than seventeen years old; or mentally defective; or mentally
incapacitated; or physically helpless
Id.
I Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
4See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20 (McKinney 1998).
5 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984).
6 Id. Liberta's second equal protection argument rested on the marital
exemption then in New York's rape laws. The first court dismissed the
indictment because of the marital exemption, but the Appellate Division found
it unavailing because a temporary order of protection extended to Mrs.
Liberta. Id at 160, 474 N.E.2d at 570, 485 N.Y.S. 2d at 210. On appeal, he
did not argue the exemption applied to him, but that its existence made the law
unconstitutional, since it gave those married different protections than rapists
like himself. Id.
7 Id. at 167-170, 474 N.E.2d at 576-78, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 216-218. "A
statute which treats males and females differently violated equal protection
unless the classification is substantially related to the achievement of an
2See
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deemed arguments that men raped by women somehow suffer less
than women raped by men as rooted in "archaic and overbroad
generalizations.., grounded in long-standing stereotypical
notions between the sexes."' The court regarded the statutory
goal of "protecting women's chastity" as illegitimate, and the
prevention of unwanted pregnancies an incidental result of rape
laws. Instead, the preservation of bodily integrity remained the
lawful aim of the rape statutes.' Though noting the rarity of
rapes perpetrated by females upon males, the court concluded a
"gender neutral law would indisputably better serve, even if
marginally, the objective of deterring and punishing forced sexual
Finding the State failed to justify the gender
assault." 1"
restriction, the court ruled the rape and sodomy laws
unconstitutional."
However, Mr. Liberta did not walk out of jail in 1984. The
court - possibly moved by the brutality of his acts - struck the
"being a male" language, and upheld the conviction.' The court
held that when reviewing an unconstitutional gender-specific law
a "court may either strike the statute, and thus make it applicable
to nobody, or extend coverage of the statute to those formerly
important governmental objective." Id. (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 280, 388 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); People v.
Whidden, 51 N.Y.2d 457, 460, 415 N.E.2d 927, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932, 928
(1980)).
8 Id. at 167, 474 N.E.2d at 577, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
9Id. at 168-69, 474 N.E.2d at 577, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 216. "[Ihe very fact
that the statute proscribes 'forcible compulsion' shows that its overriding
purpose is to protect a woman from an unwanted, forcible, and often violent
sexual
intrusion into her body." Id.
10 Id.
at 170, 474 N.E.2d at 577, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
11
Id., 474 N.E.2d at 578, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 217. The sodomy statutes are
not gender-specific, but contained the dubious marital exemptions which the
court also found unconstitutional. The court noted the common-law doctrine
underpinning the marital exemptions - that wives belonged to their husbands came from a bygone era no longer deserving of legal reinforcement. Id. at
164-67, 474 N.E.2d at 573, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213-15. In addition, the court
reasoned rape by a spouse was equally as painful, humiliating, and deserving
of punishment as rape by a stranger, or rape by a woman of a man. Id. at
166,
474 N.E.2d at 575, 485 N.Y.S. at 215.
'2 Id.
at 172, 474 N.E.2d at 579, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
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excluded."' 3
Such court must decide "what course the
Legislature would have chosen to follow had it foreseen [a]
conclusion as to underinclusiveness." 14 Weighing the striking all
of New York's forcible rape laws and extending their coverage to
women, the court concluded the Legislature would have wanted
the latter. 5
As a result of Liberta, the New York State Legislature removed
the male-only language in two of New York's rape statutes, Rape
in the Second Degree, 16 and Rape in the Third Degree 7 - the
latter law covering statutory rape where the defendant is over
twenty-one years old.'" Earlier versions of the bill earmarked the
Sexual Misconduct law for gender-neutralization, but, without
explanation, that proposal was left off the final legislation.' 9
B. The Sexual Misconduct Law and Statutory Rape
In 1989, New York courts started applying the Liberta holding
to Sexual Misconduct cases. In People v. Dieudonne,20 the
defendants were convicted of Sexual Misconduct for consensual
sex with a minor female. In reviewing the conviction, the court
agreed with the defense's equal protection argument, finding no
evidence that singling out males for punishment furthered an
important governmental objective. 2 ' The court also followed
Liberta by eliminating the male-only language, and not reversing
the conviction.' Nevertheless, in the "interests of justice," the
Id. at 170, 474 N.E.2d at 578, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
14 Id. (citing Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979); Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543
(1942)).
15Id. at 172-73, 474 N.E.2d at 579-80, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
16 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.30 (McKinney 1998).
This section now
provides that "[a] person" may be guilty of rape. Id.
17See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25 (McKinney 1998).
'81987 N.Y. LAWS 509.
'9 Donnino,
Practice Commentaries, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130 at 571
(McKinney 1987).
20 143 Misc. 2d 559, 544 N.Y.S.2d 705 (2d Dep't 1989).
21 id. at 560, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
2 Id. at 561, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
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court vacated the sentences. 3 In 1991, the Fourth Department
also found § 130.20(1) violated the Equal Protection Clause. -4
Again, like in Liberta, the court excised the male-only language
and upheld the prosecution. However, as in Dieudonne, the court
acted in the "interests of justice," this time dismissing the case of
a 13 year-old who had otherwise consensual sex with a 15 yearold female.2 In another recent case, a Delaware County judge
declared § 130.20(1) unconstitutional as written, upheld
prosecution under gender-neutral interpretation of2 6the law, and
then dismissed the case in the "interests of justice."
It is important to note that while consensual sex with a teenage
minor - usually called statutory rape - is covered by the Sexual
Misconduct statute, that is not all that law covers. Male-only
statutory rape laws passed constitutional scrutiny in 1981, when
the Supreme Court decided Michael M. v. Superior Court of
Sonoma County.27 The California law focused only on males
engaging in sex with women too young to give consent.' The
Court found the law advanced the legitimate governmental
interest of preventing teenage pregnancies; that while females
faced "the natural sanction" of pregnancy, young boys did not.2
The gender-restriction facilitated enforcement by insulating from
prosecution females who reported sexual incidents. 30 The Court

23 Id.
24

In re Jessie C., 164 A.D.2d 731, 734, 565 N.Y.S.2d 941, 943 (4th Dep't

1991).

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment

states in pertinent part: "No state shall...deny to any person within its

jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." Id.
2 Id. at 736, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
26 People v. M.K.R., 166 Misc. 2d 456, 632 N.Y.S.2d 382 (Crim. Ct.
Delaware County 1995).
27 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
28 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (Vest 1981). California Penal Code defined
unlawful sexual intercourse as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with
a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of
1829years." Id.
MichaelM., 450 U.S. at 471-72.
3) Id. at 475.
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deferred to the California Supreme Court's findings that its
legislature considered these goals when enacting the statute."1
In contrast to the California law, § 130.20(1) does not punish
only sexual intercourse with a female minor, but all
nonconsensual sex, including forcible rape.
Section33
130.05(2)(b) 2 requires consent for sex, and subdivision (3)(a)
defines consent as something unattainable from a person under
seventeen. These provisions do not distinguish between the
sexes. 34
For § 130.20(1) to survive an equal protection
challenge, the State must demonstrate the gender restriction also
makes sense when lack of consent is based on force, or when the
victim is mentally retarded or chemically incapacitated. The New
York Court of Appeals has already ruled forcible rape laws
preserve personal safety, and only remotely serve to prevent
pregnancies. 35 Since § 130.20(1) is a more extensive statute, the
alleged important governmental objective of "reduction of teen
pregnancies" relied on in Michael M. cannot suffice for the New
York law under intermediate scrutiny.3 6

The Fourth Department noted the catch-all nature of §130.20(1)
when it ruled it unconstitutional as written despite Michael M.
and a previous Court of Appeals decision on New York's felony
statutory rape law.37 In People v. Whidden,38 the Court of
Appeals upheld a gender-specific rape statute which listed specific
ages required to prosecute males only. The court ruled that this
gender classification could properly rest with the Legislature's
" Id. at 472.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(2) (McKinney 1998). This section states in

31

pertinent part: "Lack of consent results from incapacity to consent..." Id.
3'N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3) (McKinney 1998). This section states in
pertinent part: "A person is deemed incapable of consent when he is ...
less
than seventeen years old..." Id.

3 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (McKinney 1998).
35Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 168, 474 N.E.2d at 576, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
36 See Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981).
3 In re Jessie C., 164 A.D.2d 731, 565 N.Y.S.2d 941 (4th Dep't 1991).
38 51 N.Y.2d 455, 415 N.E.2d 927, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980). Penal Law
§130.25 then stated "a male is guilty of rape in the third degree
when ...being twenty-one years old or more, he engages in sexual
intercourse with a female less than seventeen years old." Id. at 459.
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permissible goal of reducing the likelihood of teen pregnancies
and the exploitation of young women by older men. 9 Because §
130.20(1) proscribes both forcible and nonforcible intercourse,
the Fourth Department found it fell into the same category as the
gender-specific rape laws declared unconstitutional in Liberta.,o
The court also found no "substantial relationship" between the
objective of preventing pregnancy and a statute that permits
irresponsible young women to engage in sex with teenage boys
without facing criminal sanction.4"
M. THE QUESTIONABLE INTERPRETATIONS OF A
QUESTIONABLE LAW
Convictions
A. Upholding
UnconstitutionalLaws

Under

Underinclusive,

In Liberta,42 the Court of Appeals saved the conviction of a
violent rapist by removing the male-only provision of the rape
law. 43 Relying on Liberta, recent courts similarly struck the
unconstitutional gender restriction of the Sexual Misconduct law,
rewrote the law as gender-neutral, but then curtailed prosecutions
in the interests of justice. However, Liberta was flawed, relying
on cases which did not support the decision to revise and retain
an unconstitutional law.'
Courts rarely strike an invalid provision of a criminal law to
expand the statute's coverage.4" The Supreme Court cases relied
39 Id.

at 460-61, 415 N.E.2d at 928, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
40 In re Jessie C., 164 A.D.2d at 733, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 943.

Despite

Whidden the Legislature revised the Rape in the Third Degree law in 1987 by
removing the male-only restriction. 1987 N.Y. LAWS 509.
41 Id. at 733, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
42 64 N.Y. 2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984).
43 1d.
at 172-73, 474 N.E.2d at 579, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
44 Id.

4'Bouie

v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964) (reversing trespass
convictions of Civil Rights protesters because only as judicially interpreted did
trespass statute punish a "refusal to leave") (citing Pierce v. United States,
314 U.S. 306, 311 (1941)). "[Jjudicial enlargement of a criminal act by
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on in Liberta dealt mostly with underinclusive benefits statutes. 46
The Court recited Justice Harlan's dicta that courts facing an
underinclusive law "may either declare it a nullity and order that
its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to
benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include
those who are aggrieved by exclusion. ' 47 However, Harlan
explained that when a statute "authorizes no positive action [like
criminal laws], there is no occasion to consider remedial" options
49
like extending coverage.18 Thus in Welsh v. United States,

Justice Harlan voted to reverse Welsh's conviction because the
religious component of the Draft law's conscientious objector
exemption was underinclusive and violated the Establishment
Clause. 0 He noted the other choice, striking the exemption
entirely, would not help Mr. Welsh who faced a five years
Similarly, the Supreme Court faced with other
sentence. 5
underinclusive laws did not expand the breadth of the law, but
ended prosecution under it. 52

If not dismissing the case, the

interpretation is at war with a fundamental concept of the common law that
crimes must be defined with appropriate definiteness." Id.
46 Liberia, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 170, 474 N.E.2d 567, 577, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207,
218 (citing Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (removing gender
restriction that permitted additional welfare aid only to families whose father
was recently unemployed). In addition, the parties in Westcot agreed that
extension rather than invalidation of the statute was proper; the only issue was
whether the revised law should extend benefits to any family where a parent
was suddenly unemployed or to just those where the "principal wage earner"
lost his or her job. Califano, 443 U.S. at 91.
47 Liberia, 64 N.Y.2d at 170, 474 N.E.2d at 578, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 218
(citing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 362 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
48 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
49398 U.S. 333 (1970).
50 Id. at 356.
"' Id. "Since this created a religious benefit not accorded to petitioner, it is
clear to me that this conviction must be reversed under the Establishment
Clause ... unless Mr. Welsh is to go remediless." Id. (citing Iowa-Des
Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931)).
52 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (striking ordinance
banning signs that contained numerous exceptions as underinclusive); R.A.V.
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Court at least relieved the extra burden placed on the
treated party, rather than extend the treatment to those
by the flawed law. Thus, in Skinner v. Oklalzoma,53
vacated a sterilization order where the state law

unequally
exempted
the Court
mandated

habitual thieves suffer the procedure, but not similarly situated
parties like recidivist embezzlers.- The Court left Oklahoma to
55
decide whether it would sterilize embezzlers as well.

The other cases relied on by the Liberta court for invalidating
part of a statute but permitting continued prosecution did not
support

its

conclusion.

The

unconstitutional and easily severable

cases

either

amendments, 5"

dealt

with

or instances

where the courts followed the directions of a severability clause.57
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking hate speech law as
unconstitutional because it imposed special prohibitions on certain speakers).
53 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
54 Id. at 541-43.
55 Id. at 543. The Court stated "[ilt is by no means clear whether, if an
excision were made, this particular constitutional difficulty might be solved by
enlarging on the one hand on the other the class of criminals who might be
sterilized." Id. Cf Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508, 534535 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
m6Liberita, 64 N.Y.2d at 171, 474 N.E.2d at 578, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 218
(citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (finding the death
penalty provision unconstitutional, but severed the provision because it was a
separate amendment passed 60 years after the initial statute). See also Liberta,
64 N.Y.2d at 172 n.15, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 173 n.15, 474 N.E.2d at 579 n.15
(citing Iowa v. Books, 225 N.W.2d 322, 325 (1975) (relying on severability
clause, striking only underinclusive provision in amendment added after
statute's passage); Ohio v. Burgun, 359 N.E.2d 1018 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976)
(reversing conviction, and striking underinclusive exemption contained in
separate provision, and passed after original statute); Tom & Jerry, Inc. v.
Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Neb. 1968) (upholding
statute but invalidating an underinclusive amendment that was "not an
inducement to passage.")).
5 Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 173 n. 15, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 173 n.15, 474 N.E.2d
at 579 n.15 (citing Plas v. State, 598 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1979) (relying on
severability clause to remove "by a female" language from prostitution statute,
and upholding conviction)). Also cited, City of Duluth v. Sarette, 283 N.W.2d
533 (Minn., 1979) (after reversing conviction, striking invalid statutory
exception under severability clause); People v. Henry, 21 P.2d 672, 677 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1933)) (striking arbitrary exemption of certain carriers but upholding
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No scrutiny of the "severability provisions" of the rape laws
arose in Liberta; nor did the Fourth Department or the Appellate
Term investigate the statutory history of the Sexual Misconduct
law. The Sexual Misconduct statute was created in 1965 when
the Legislature revised the entire Penal Law.5" The provision
derives from two older felony laws.
Displeased with the

"stigma" a felony conviction posed for young men who "may

well have been persuaded by the victim into committing the act
[i.e. intercourse or sodomy]," the Legislature sought a lesser
sanction." 9 Restricting application of the law only to boys was

not explained. In addition, C.P.L. § 170.35' provides for the
dismissal of prosecutions under unconstitutional laws; it does not

suggest curing the ill by permitting the prosecutor to punish even
more persons. 6' Moreover, the Court of Appeals declined to
expand the scope of the gender-specific public exposure law, 62 or
the underinclusive consensual sodomy law. 63
portion of statute convicting defendant noting "the act itself has the usual
savings clause . . ."); State v. McClearly. 308 S.E.2d 883 (N.C. Ct. App.
1983)) (striking underinclusive exemption placed in separate provision of
gambling statute, relying on severability clause).
" See Governor's Memoranda on Bills Approved, reprinted in 1965 N.Y.
Legis. Ann. 530. The Revised Penal Law of 1965 was the first significant and
comprehensive revision of the Penal Law since 1881. See also Morris
Plascowe, Sex Offenses in the New Penal Law, 32 BROOK. L. REv. 274
(1966).
59 id.

60 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 170.35(1) (McKinney 1998). The section states in
pertinent part: "An information, simplified information, prosecutor's
information or misdemeanor complaint, or a count thereof, is defective within
the meaning of paragraph (a) of subsection one of section 170.30 when ...
[t]he
statute defining the offense charged is unconstitutional or otherwise invalid."
Id.
61 Id.

62

People v. Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d 875, 881, 600 N.E.2d 232, 234, 587

N.Y.S.2d 601, 605 (1992) (Titone, J., concurring) (arguing for dismissal
because "public exposure" law unjustifiably listed additional body parts only
women could not expose).
63 People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 495, 415 N.E.2d 936, 943, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947, 954 (1980) (striking consensual sodomy law because it
prohibited only non-married persons from engaging in such acts, and
overturned the defendant's conviction),
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Finally, the expansion remedy sanctioned in Liberta and
repeated with respect to the Sexual Misconduct law, only
exacerbated the Equal Protection problem that befell the
defendant. The Liberta court conceded its remedy "does treat the
defendant differently than, for example, a married man who,
while living with his wife, raped her prior to this decision."'
The court claimed this discrepancy was "justified by the
limitations imposed ... by the notice requirements of the due
process clause."' When Mario Liberta's habeas writ reached the
Second Circuit, that Court of Appeals soundly ridiculed the
rationalization:
[We cannot agree that this lack of power validates what may
otherwise be unconstitutional under the federal equal protection
clause. Before the Court of Appeals decision, the distinctions it
held to be unconstitutionally discriminatory were the law in New
York and in full force when Liberta was convicted. His
conviction is thus a result of the precise discrimination
invalidated by the court, and his federal equal protection claim
cannot be avoided because courts lack power to apply judicially
expanded criminal statutes retroactively. Had the original New
York rape and sodomy legislation applied only to black persons,
for example, its later expansion by the New York Court of
Appeals to person of all races would not validate the convictions
of blacks that occurred before the judicial expansions.c 6
Thus in Liberta, the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged a
constitutional flaw raised by the defendant, that did discriminate

6 Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 173, 474 N.E.2d at 579, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
1Id.

Liberta v. Kelly, 839 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1988). The Second Circuit
affirmed the conviction nonetheless, finding the New York rape laws did not
violate the Equal Protection clause. Id. (emphasis added). The court observed
the male-only language coincided with the statutory requirement of
"penetration" and concluded the fear of unwanted pregnancy resulting from
rape was a uniquely female concern permitting different treatment of the sexes.
Id. at83.
6
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against the defendant, but that would be ignored to uphold the
defendant's conviction. 67
B. Perverting an ExtraneousLaw to Save It

Even assuming "extending" the scope of a criminal statute may
rescue a prosecution, a court is supposed to ask "what course the
Legislature would have chosen to follow had it foreseen our
conclusion as to underinclusiveness." 68
However, with
§130.20(1), legislative "foresight" is not even an issue; the
Legislature "saw" the Liberta court rule male-only rape laws
violated the Constitution. Thus in 1987, the Legislature acted to
revise those laws and make some of them gender neutral.6 9 The
Legislature's Law Revision Commission advised removal of
marital and gender classifications as early as 1985.70
Nevertheless, the final bill passed specifically and inexplicably
left the male-only language in the Sexual Misconduct law.71
Therefore, it would seem the message left by the Legislature's
scrupulous avoidance of redressing the gender classification of
§130.20(1) is that it did not want women to face prosecution
under the misdemeanor Sexual Misconduct law.
Perhaps
legislators did not want young women prosecuted for consensual
sexual encounters with slightly underaged males. Nevertheless,
the other courts that rewrote § 130.20(1) without the male-only
statement succeeded in saving a statute by extending its coverage
to a portion of the population the Legislature clearly never sought
to punish.'
6 Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 172-73, 474 N.E.2d at 579, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
6 Id. at 171, 474 N.E.2d at 578, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
69

1987 N.Y. LAWS 510, §§ 1, 2.

70

LawRev. Comm. ON FEMALE AND MARITAL ExEMPTIONS CONTAINED IN

OF THE PENAL LAW, LEG. Doc. No. 65[11], reprinted in The
State of New York Law Revision Commission Report (1986).
71 In re Jessie C., 164 A.D.2d at 735, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 943. See also
Donnino, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130 (McKinney 1987).
' Cf. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961) (holding that
"[a]lthough this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it
against constitutional attack, it must not carry this to the point of perverting the

ARTICLE 130.00

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss2/13

12

McNamara: Sexual Misconduct

1998

SEXUAL MISCONDUCT

491

Not only is the expansion of § 130.20 contraindicated by
legislative efforts, but it is unnecessary. New York's statutory
scheme for sex offenses is replete with redundant statutes
covering the same behavior. Penal Law § 130.35(1)73 proscribes
forcible law (Rape in the First Degree). Indeed, in forcible rape
cases, the elements of Sexual Misconduct and Rape in the First
Degree merge.74 Similarly, § 130.25 (Rape in the Third Degree)
punishes nonconsensual sexual intercourse where incapacity due
to age is not an issue - and unlike § 130.35 or § 130.20(1), it
Section 130.30" criminalizes sex
applies to both genders.
between one eighteen and older, with one under fourteen.
Section 130.25(2)76 classifies as a E felony sex between a minor
and a person twenty-one or older. Even consensual sex between
minors is covered by another statute, P.L. § 130.557 (Sexual
purpose of the statute" or judicially rewriting it); Heckler v. Matthews, 465
U.S. 728, 739 n.5 (1984) (noting that "[a]lIthough the choice between
extension and nullification is within the competence of federal district court,
and ordinarily extension, rather than nullification, is the proper course, the
court should not, of course, use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of
the legislature") (citations omitted).
73 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 (1) (McKinney 1998).
71 People v. McEaddy, 30 N.Y.2d 519, 280 N.E.2d 891, 330 N.Y.S.2d 65
(1972) (holding defendant not guilty of rape in the first degree because of
insufficient evidence of force could not be convicted of § 130.20(1) on a
forcible compulsion theory).
75 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.30 (McKinney 1998). This section states: "A
person is guilty of rape in the second degree when, being eighteen years old or
more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person whom the
actor is not married less that fourteen years old." Id.
76 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25 (2) (McKinney 1998). This section states in
pertinent part that: "A person is guilty of rape in the third degree
when...[b]eing twenty-one years old or more, he or she engages in sexual
intercourse with another person to whom the actor is not married less than
seventeen years old." Id.
'n N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.55 (McKinney 1998). The provision states:
A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree when
he subjects another person to sexual contact without the
latter's consent; except that in any prosecution under this
section, it is an affirmative defense that (a) such other
person's lack of consent was due solely to incapacity to
consent by reason of being less than seventeen years old, and
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Abuse in the Third Degree). A class B misdemeanor, this law
punishes any "sexual contact" committed without consent."
However, the law provides an affirmative defense where the lack
of consent is premised solely to incapacity to consent because the
complaint is less than seventeen (but older than 14), and where
the defendant is less than five years older than the complainant.79
Thus, a teenage boy like Nelson V., who admits to sex with his
fourteen year-old girl-friend, has an affirmative defense to the
lesser B misdemeanor, but none to the more serious A
misdemeanor, Sexual Misconduct charge. With all this built-in
redundancy in the sex offense statutory scheme, the momentary
loss of § 130.20(1) would not reap a "disastrous effect on the
public interest and safety," like striking the felony rape and
sodomy laws at issue in Liberta.8 °
C. So Which Kids Get Charged?
In the cases of Nelson V. and Joe M., all parties were over
fourteen years of age, but under seventeen. Since the females
lacked the ability to legally consent to sex, they could not be
charged as "accomplices" under New York law. 8 Likewise, if
(b) such other person was more that fourteen years old, and
(c) the defendant was less than five years older than such
other person.
Id.
78

id.

See N.Y. PENAL Law § 130.55 (McKinney 1987).
'oLiberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 171, 474 N.E.2d at 578, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 218
(noting the historically serious treatment afforded "forcible sexual assaults.").
See also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 365 (1970) (examining
whether to extend or nullify, the court should "measure the intensity of
commitment to the residual policy and consider the degree of potential
disruption of the statutory scheme that would occur by extension as opposed to
abrogation.").
8 People v. Fielding, 39 N.Y.2d 607, 611, 385 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1976); People
v. Facey, 115 A.D.2d 11, 14, 499 N.Y.S.2d 517, 519 (4th Dep't 1986).
Compare with Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 476
(1980) (Stewart, J., concurring) (defending California's male-only statutory
rape law, noting other provisions permitted prosecution of underaged females
as accomplices).
79
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the girls had been charged first under a gender-neutral
§130.20(1), the boys would have been insulated from accomplice
liability. Thus, by removing the gender classification, the courts
removed the mechanism for designating culpability when both
parties are underaged. Gender-neutralizing § 130.20 invites a
race to the courthouse to determine "victim" and "defendant"
when both could be charged, but only one may be prosecuted.
In addition, the judicially revised Sexual Misconduct law
invites selective prosecution. If prosecutors refuse to charge
females, extending statutory coverage to both sexes is
meaningless. If both persons are underage, and a District
Attorney only prosecuted boys because of their gender, similarly
situated parties are treated unequally, once again violating
guarantees of equal protection." Therefore, attempts to repair
the equal protection problem by eliminating the gender restriction
may merely remove the dejure discrimination to a defacto level.
The queer judicial interpretation of § 130.20(1) also invites
differential treatment by the courts. In all the aforementioned
cases (Dieudonne, In re Jessie C., and M.K.R.) after revising the
law, the courts still forestalled prosecutions by acting "in the
interests of justice."8 In Jessie C., the boy was thirteen and the
girl fifteen; 4 in M.K.R., the boy sixteen, the girl fourteen.'
Both Nelson V. and Joe M. were sixteen, and the girls fourteen.
However, despite their lack of criminal records, their youth, and
the undisputed fact that the sex was consensual, the Clayton
motions8' of both boys were denied. Both walked away with
1 303 W. 42d St. Corp. v. Klein, 46 N.Y.2d 686, 389 N.E.2d 815, 416
N.Y.S.2d 219 (1979); University Club v. City of New York, 655 F. Supp.
1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see generally Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
373-74 (1886).
' In re Jessie C., 164 A.D.2d at 735, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 944; People v.
Dieudonne, 143 Misc. 2d 559, 560, 544 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1989); People v. M.K.R., 166 Misc. 2d 456, 463, 632 N.Y.S.2d
382, 384 (Crim. Ct. Delaware County 1995).
84 164 A.D.2d at 733, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
'

166 Misc. 2d at 458, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 383.

See Hon. Stephen G. Crane, PretrialHearings in Criminal Cases, N.Y.S.
BAR Assoc. (1991). The Clayton Motion is named for People v. Clayton 41
A.D.2d 204, 342 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2nd Dep't 1973), the case that established
16
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Adjournments in Contemplation of Dismissals (ACD's), thanks in
part to judges applying more subtle pressure on the District
Attorney's office. However, these dispositions came after several
court appearances, hearings, or other pretrial work, motions,
replies, and responses. Defendants and complainants missed time
from school. All suffered from the inadequacy of a flawed
statute and the subsequent errant opinions that leave § 130.20(1)
on a fence where every prosecution of underage, consenting
minors may end up in a Clayton hearing. Striking this provision
would force the Legislature to act, and properly consider what
role the Sexual Misconduct law serves in the arsenal of sexual
offense statutes, and how to best tailor it to serve those goals.
IV. SOME SUGGESTED STATUTORY REVISIONS
A. Back to Boys Only?
A male-only law punishing underage boys for sexual encounters
with underaged girls was previously upheld in Michael M. 7
Perhaps the only required revision is some distinct provision
separate from the current catch-all § 130.20(1). A male-only law
avoids the "designation of culpability" problem resulting for a
gender-neutral statute, for only boys face charges. However, in
Michael M., the dissent leveled several sharp criticisms that bear
repeating. First, any statutory rape law faces enforcement
difficulties given the consensual nature of the proscribed
behavior, and neither party wishing to prosecute."8 Second, a
male-only law reinforces sexist notions that sexual encounters
ultimately remain the choice and responsibility of males.89 Third,
that a court may dismiss an indictment in the interest of justice. See also N.Y.

CRim. PROC. LAW § 210.40 (McKinney 1998).
s7 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981).
'8 Id. at 492 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (relating the low nationwide statistics
on enforcement of statutory rape laws).
9 1d. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[I]f we view the government's interests as that of a parens
partiae seeking to protect its subjects from harming
themselves, the discrimination is actually perverse. Would a
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what of the promiscuous young female? Under the plurality's
view, statutory rape laws protect society from unwanted teenage
pregnancies.' A "boys only" law may permit girls to repeatedly
inflict on society such resource draining offspring, or let criminal
instigators off where reproduction does not occur. 91
Finally, a boys only law ignores certain temporal changes in
society. Even California revamped their statutory rape law to
cover female offenders.9 Only five states retain gender specific
rape statutes. 3
The hue and cry amongst recent welfare
reformers is to remove incentives for young mothers to get
pregnant; what Justice Rehnquist called a "natural sanction,"
today's lawmakers deride as "natural windfall."'
New York
permits abortion on demand, with no parental notification or
consent requirements. Condoms are increasingly available. As
one Brooklyn judge noted, both boys and girls face sexually

rational parent making rules for the conduct of twin children
of opposite sex simultaneously forbid the son and authorize
the daughter to engage in conduct that is especially harmful
to the daughter?
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
0Id. at 475 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 502 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "If a discarded male parmer informs
on a promiscuous female, a timely threat of prosecution might well prevent the
precise harm the statue is intended to minimize."
Id. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
I Susannah Miller, The Overturning of Michael A.: Statutory Rape Law
Becomes Gender Neutral in California, 5 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 289 (Fall
1994). Ms. Miller chronicles how outrage over widely publicized incidents
where older women seduced teenage boys prompted the legislature to
reconsider its position.
93 See People v. Yates, 168 Misc. 2d 101, 109 n. 10, 637 N.Y.S.2d 625 n.
10, 630 n. 10 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1996). "According to a 1995 table
of statutes compiled by the National Victim Center in Arlington, VA., these
states" include Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, and Mississippi. Id.
I Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1980). Justice
Rehnquist stated "[tihe risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial
deterrence to young females. No similar natural sanctions deter males. A
criminal sanction imposed solely on males thus serves to roughly 'equalize' the
deterrents of the sexes." Id. at 473 (emphasis added).
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transmitted diseases such as AIDS. 95 Thus pregnancy is neither
the only nor the greatest deterrent to teenage sexual activity.
B. ProsecutingBoth Sexes Equally
As noted, in 1987 the Legislature removed the male-only
language of two sex offenses but did not change § 130.20(1).
Over the last few years, both houses have proposed genderneutralizing that law.96 Each bill would replace the "being a
male" language of the Sexual Misconduct law with "he or she."'
In addition, the measure would also make gender neutral the
crimes of sexual abuse and first degree rape. 98

Mainly, the Legislative proposals just sanction the work of the

Liberta99 and Jessie C. 1°° courts.

While frequently gaining

bipartisan support, the proposals do not squarely address the issue
of underage minors having sex. There remains the problem with
designating culpability, which invites a "race to the courthouse"
to decide who is prosecuted. Moreover, the possibility of a
dismissal in the "interests of justice" might decline with the
legislative approval of a gender-neutral law.
C. GenderNeutral with a Defense
Perhaps a better solution already resides within a lesser
included offense of Sexual Misconduct. As mentioned, § 130.55
9 People v. Nathan, No. 95K053815, slip op. at 3 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Kings
County, Mar. 8, 1996) (upholding information charging 38 year-old woman
for sex with a teenage boy under § 130.20(1)).
' N.Y.A.744, 214th Sess. (1991); N.Y.A.3362, 216th Sess. (1993) N.Y.A.
2078, 216th Sess. (1993). N.Y. S. 6580, 218th Sess. (1995). N.Y.A. 4832,
220th Sess. (1997) N.Y.A.148, 220th Sess. (1997).
91 N.Y.A.148, 220th Sess. (1997).
98 Id. However, the sexual abuse statutes do not appear to be facially gender
specific. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.55, 130.60, 130.65, 130.67, 130.70.
(McKinney 1984). These provisions all use the pronoun "he" which does not
designate males-only under New York law. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(7)
(McKinney 1998 ).
99 64 N.Y. 2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984).
'00 164 A.D.2d 731, 565 N.Y.S.2d 941 (4th Dep't 1991).
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(Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree) punishes any nonconsensual
sexual contact with one proviso: if the consent is lacking only due
to age, and the defendant is within five years of the complainant,
he or she has an affirmative defense.10' This defense was added
to "exclude from criminality such things as the heavy necking
party between fourteen, fifteen, or sixteen year old victim and
another young though criminally responsible person of sixteen
years of slightly greater age." 02 With respect to sexual
intercourse, the societal concerns of teenage pregnancy or
spreading disease may warrant a tighter age differential. Perhaps
the defense should be retricted to persons within three years of
the younger's age. Therefore, boys or girls seventeen or younger
would have a defense if fornicating with a fourteen year old.
Persons under sixteen could not be convicted of Sexual
Misconduct when copulating with a fellow teenager of at least
fourteen. An eighteen year-old who "fraternizes" with a
fourteen year-old may still face prosecution. Such a person
introduces on a presumably less mature and responsible person
the ill-effects of sex, including disease or pregnancy.
Exploitation of younger persons by older ones forms the basis of
several current sex offense laws. 0 It is under this notion of
exploitation that the Court of Appeal upheld the male-only felony
statutory rape law in Whidden.'"
This sliding scale would, as best as a law can, compensate for
the varying degrees of teen maturity. Considering New York's
youthful offender laws, most teens who violate § 130.20(1) would
escape a criminal record even if convicted.10 By effectively
101 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.55 (McKinney 1998).
1o Donnino, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130 at 571
(McKinney 1987) (citing Staff Comments of the Commission of Revision of
the Penal Law. McKinney's Special Pamphlet (1965) p. 276)).
103N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.25 - Rape in the Third degree; § 130.35(3) Rape in the First degree; § 130.50(3) - Sodomy in the First Degree; §
130.65(3) - Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree. (McKinney 1998).
104 People v. Whidden, 51 N.Y.2d 457, 465, 434 N.Y.S.2d 936, 939 (1980).
105N.Y. CRM. PRoc. LAW §§ 720.10-720.35. These provisions mandate

the sealing of convictions of all first-time misdemeanor offenders under the age
of nineteen, and limits to six months the jail sentence the minor may face. Id.
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decriminalizing most teenage sex, the State would save the
expense of trials, useless probationary review. Prosecutors could
pursue other matters without fearing attacks by "aggrieved"
parents. The specific age delineation would displace a District
Attorney's subjective evaluation of maturity, eschewing selective
prosecution or other due process problems.
V. CONCLUSION
Of course, the Legislature could just decriminalize consensual
sex between minors altogether. Add to § 130.20(1) the phrase
"except where lack of consent is premised solely upon incapacity
due to age and the person [i.e. suspect] is also incapable of
consenting due to age."
Minors who exploit drunken or
physically helpless peers would still face prosecution. This
revised law might be more realistic by being less paternalistic and not permit parents who failed to inculcate certain values on
their children to pester prosecutors into converting a "rite of
passage" into a challenge of Constitutional rights.
Whatever approach is eventually adopted, hopefully its pitfalls
and practicalities will face a thorough examination within the
legislative process. Child psychologists, sociologists, health care
professionals, etc. may bring more developed theories to the
debate. What if any role does criminal prosecution serve in
deterring kids from having sex? If the only legitimate purpose
statutory rape laws can serve concern public health as opposed to
public morals, does incarceration up to a six months in jail
succeed where education fails? These valid questions remain
unanswered while prosecutors undertake (often half-heartedly)
costly prosecutions of teens under an invalid law. Given the
limits of judicial correction, and the lack of limits on
prosecutorial discretion, legislative revision of the Sexual
Misconduct statute is in order, and overdue.
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